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COMMENT
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MARGIN VIOLATIONS-THE EFFECT
OF SECTION 7(f) AND REGULATION X
I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial portion of "federal corporation law" that has developed in the
federal courts since the passage of the Securities Act of 19332 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 19343 has involved the implication of private civil liability for
the violation of sections of the 1934 Act and the rules adopted thereunder. These
violations include, inter alia, the extension of credit in violation of the margin
requirements established by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to section 74
of the 1934 Act.
The recognition of such a cause of action has presented the courts with three
difficult problems. First is the identification of the legal basis for implying a
private cause of action for a violation of the margin requirements. Second is the
extent to which an investor's participation in the transaction constituting a
violation bars him from relief.5 Third is the nature and extent of the remedy to
which a successful plaintiff is entitled. The addition of section 7(f) in 1970,a
and the promulgation by the Board of Regulation X7 making unlawful the
obtaining of credit in violation of the margin requirements, have given rise to
questions regarding the continuing viability of the principles that underlie the
implication of civil liability for violation of the margin requirements.
II. THE MARGIN REQIREMENTS
Section 7 of the 1934 Act gives the Federal Reserve Board authority to reg-
ulate the amount of credit available in the securities market "[f]or the purpose
1. See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1146
(1965).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970).
3. Id. §§ 78a et seq.
4. Id. § 78g.
5. Phrased differently, the question is to what extent can the lender who extended credit
beyond the level permitted by the margin requirements rely upon the doctrine of pari delicto
as a defense in an action by an investor? The common law doctrine of pari delicto holds
that where two parties are equally blameworthy in an illegal transaction, neither will be per-
mitted to recover from the other. Restatement of Contracts § 598 (1932). In the classic case,
the defendant interposes the defense of illegality as a bar to enforcement of the contract.
The plaintiff asserts that the illegality is immaterial since he is not in pari delicto with de-
fendant. 6A A. Corbin, Contracts §§ 1534-40 (1962). In the margin rules context, the con-
tract has usually been performed and it is the defendant who interposes pad delicto as a bar
to restitution. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
6. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 301, 84 Stat. 1124 (codified at 15 US.C.
§ 78g(f) (1970)).
7. 12 C.F.R. § 224 (1974).
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of preventing the excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying of secu-
rifles." Section 7(c) makes it unlawful for "any member of a national securities
exchange or any broker or dealer" to extend, maintain, or arrange credit to or
for any customer on any security, without collateral or with any collateral other
than securities, except in compliance with the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Federal Reserve Board. 9 In addition, section 7(d) makes it unlawful for
any person not subject to subsection (c) to extend or maintain or to arrange
the extension or maintenance of credit, for the purpose of purchasing or carrying
securities, where the extension, maintenance, or arranging contravenes the rules
and regulations of the Board.' 0 Pursuant to the authority granted it by section 7,
the Board has promulgated Regulations T, G,'1 2 U,' 3 and X,14 each of which
requires that for certain transactions to be lawful, the customer must present
sufficient collateral within a specified periodrs
Regulation T governs the extension of credit by brokers.' 0 A purchase trans-
action carried out for a customer's special cash account' 7 complies with Reg-
ulation T if there is sufficient cash in the account at the time of the transaction,
or the broker makes the purchase relying in good faith on the customer's agree-
ment promptly to pay in full and his representation that he intends not to sell
the security prior to payment.' 8 In addition, if payment is not made within
seven business days after the purchase, the broker must "cancel or otherwiso
liquidate the transaction."' 19 A sale is a valid cash transaction if the security
is held in the account, or if the broker is informed by the customer that he owns
the security, and the broker relies in good faith on the customer's agreement to
deliver the security promptly.20 Unlike the rule regarding a purchase, there is
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1970).
9. Id. § 78g(c).
10. Id. § 78g(d).
11. 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1974) (as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 1006 (1974), and 39 Fed. Reg.
1974 (1974)).
12. Id. § 207 (as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 1974 (1974)).
13. Id. § 221 (as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 1006 (1974), and 39 Fed. Reg. 1974 (1974)).
14. Id. § 224.
15. The margin requirements thus regulate only the "initial margin." The rule of most
stock exchanges (e.g. rule 431 of the New York Stock Exchange) require a "maintenance
margin," which is the deposit of additional margin in the event that the market value of the
collateral securities declines to such an extent that it is below margin. Solomon & Hart,
Recent Developments in the Regulation of Securities Credit, 20 J. Pub. L. 167, 172 & n.31
(1971). It has been held that violation of a maintenance margin required by an exchange
rule does not give rise to a private cause of action. Gordon v. duPont Glore Forgan Inc.,
487 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3071 (1974).
16. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1 et seq. (1974).
17. Cash transactions are included in the special cash account. Id. § 220.4(c) (1974). All
transactions not included in one of the special accounts, id. § 220.4, are recorded In the gen-
eral account. Id. § 220.3.
18. Id. § 220.4(c)(1)(I).
19. Id. § 220.4(c)(2).
20. Id. § 220.4(c)(1)(ii). The actual language employed in the section is "In reliance
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no specific time period within which delivery of the security must be made, a
difference of some significance. 2 '
In order to comply with Regulation T a margin transaction cannot involve the
extension of credit beyond the "maximum loan value," 22 the inverse of which is
the required margin, i.e., the amount of cash or other collateral that must be
deposited with the broker in order for the transaction to be lawful. If the cus-
tomer's general account does not contain cash or other securities24 in sufficient
quantity to supply the required margin, the customer must deposit in the ac-
count within five business days of the transaction sufficient collateral to bring
the margin up to the required level.25
Regulation U governs the lending of money by a bank where the borrower will
use the loan proceeds for the purpose of purchasing or carrying securities, when
the loan is secured directly or indirectly by securities.2 0
Regulation G27 was adopted to dose a loophole; lenders other than banks or
brokers were unregulated in their activities and could legally extend credit for
the purchase of securities far in excess of that obtainable from regulated
sources.28 Therefore, the Board extended the margin requirements to cover per-
upon an agreement accepted by the [broker] in good faith that the security is to be promptly
deposited in the account." Id. It is doubtful that there is a significant difference between
good faith reliance on an agreement and "reliance on an agreement in good faith."
21. See Naftalin & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d 1166,
1173, 1176-80 (8th Cir. 1972); note 78 infra.
22. This value is set by the Supplement to Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.8(a) (1974),
as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 1974 (1974).
23. 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1974), as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 1006 (1974), and 39 Fed. Reg.
1974 (1974). The maximum loan values for margin securities under Regulations T, U, and G
are uniform. See 39 Fed. Reg. 1974 (1974).
24. The maximum loan value of these securities determines the extent to which they can
serve as collateral for the purchase of other securities. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.3(b) (1), (c) (1974).
25. Id. § 220.3(b)(1).
26. Id. § 221.1(a). Such loans are often referred to as "purpose loans" or "purpose crediL"
See Tartell v. Chelsea Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 (S.D.N.Y.), aid mem., 470 F.2d
994 (2d Cir. 1972); Solomon & Hart, Recent Developments in the Regulation of Securities
Credit, 20 J. Pub. L. 167, 174 (1971). Detailed rules for determining the purpose of credit
are contained in section 3(b) of Regulation U. 12 C.FR. § 221.3(b) (1974). The term "carry-
ing securities" includes the use of the proceeds of the loan to repay a debt previously in-
curred for the purchase of securities. Id. § 2213(b) (2).
27. 12 C.F.R. § 207 (1974), as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 1974 (1974).
28. See, e.g., junger v. Hertz, Neumark & Warner, 426 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 880 (1970); Bronner v. Goldman, 361 F.2d 759 (Lst Cir.), cert. denied, 385 US.
933 (1966), both involving the extension of credit by factors. But see Zatz v. Hertz, Neumark
& Warner, 262 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding that a factor not subject to the mar-
gin regulations could be liable for conspiring with a broker to violate Regulation T). As
examples of the problems that arose as a result of this loophole, see Glickman v. Schwv. ickart
& Co., 242 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp.
972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co, 218 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). These cases arose out of the
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sons who, in the ordinary course of business,29 extend or arrange "purpose
credit" 30 secured by securities. The credit extended may no longer exceed the
maximum loan value of the collateral. 1
Section 7(f) of the 1934 Act and Regulation X extend to borrowers the pro-
hibitions of the margin requirements. Section 7(f)(1) makes it unlawful to
obtain or receive credit in violation of section 7 or the rules and regulations
thereunder. Regulation X incorporates Regulations G, T, and U by reference
and makes it a violation to obtain credit in a transaction which does not conform
to those regulations.3 2
HI. STATUS OF THE LAW PRIOR TO SECTION 7(f) AND REGULATION X
A. Theoretical Basis for Implying a Private Cause of Action
An examination of the cases recognizing a cause of action in favor of a recip-
ient of credit in excess of that permitted reveals three different theories of liabil-
ity. 8 The first is a tort theory developed in Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp. 4
and based on section 286 of the first Restatement of Torts:
Broadly stated, the rule is that where defendant's violation of a prohibitory statute
has caused injury to plaintiff the latter has a right of action if one of the purposes
of the enactment was to protect individual interests like the plaintiff's.85
The court in Remar found language in the House Committee Report on section 7
to support the view that protection of the investor was a secondary purpose of
the margin requirement."6 It dismissed the argument that the plaintiff was barred
insolvency of a factor, First Discount Corp., which had engaged in the practice of making
loans beyond the level permitted by the margin requirements, and which became Insolvent
after converting the securities of the various plaintiffs.
29. 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(c) (1974).
30. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
31. 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(c) (1974); id. § 207.5, as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 1974 (1974).
32. 12 C.F.R. § 224.2(a) (1974). The wording of section 2(a) of Regulation X Is un-
fortunate in that it creates certain gaps in the coverage regarding borrowers. See notes 140-
50 infra and accompanying text.
33. For a fuller discussion of these rationales, see Note, Federal Margin Requirements as
a Basis for Civil Liability, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1462 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Margin Re-
quirements]; Note, Pearlstein v. Scudder & German: Implied Rights of Action for Violation
of Federal Margin Requirements and the Demise of the In Pari Delicto Defense, 66 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 372 (1971); 39 Fordham L. Rev. 782 (1971).
34. 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
35. Id. at 1017 (relying on Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934)).
36. Id. When put in context, the statement in which the court finds congressional pur-
pose is less weighty authority for that proposition: "Nor is the main purpose even protec-
tion of the small speculator by making it impossible for him to spread himself too thinly-
although such a result will be achieved as a byproduct of the main purpose." H.R. Rep.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), quoted in Margin Requirements 1468 n.44 (1966)
(emphasis deleted). It has been argued that a fair analysis of the whole legislative history of
the margin provisions leads to the conclusion that they were enacted solely to provide a
means of regulating the aggregate amount of credit available in the securities market, and
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from suing because of his participation in the transaction, considering that the
Congress had regarded him as "incapable of protecting himself." 37
The second rationale has developed by analogy to 1J. Case Co. v. Borak,38
which recognized a cause of action for money damages resulting from misleading
proxy statements. There, the Supreme Court considered it to be "the duty of
the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective
the congressional purpose."3 9 In Borak, however, protection of investors was
"among [the] chief purposes" of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act,40 whereas the
protection of investors is at best a subsidiary purpose of the margin require-
ments.41 On the other hand, if a private action for margin violations is viewed
as aiding "the macro-economic policy of preventing wide fluctuations in security
credit," 42 as has been argued,4 3 the conclusion that a private cause of action
furthers this purpose is speculative at best.4 Thus, it appears that the Borak
rationale does not support a private damages action for violation of the margin
requirements.
that "[alny protection of the small speculator from individual loss was merely consequential
.... " Id. at 1470-71.
The tort rationale has been used in later cases. See, e.g., Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co,
473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Goldman v. Bank of the Com-
monwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1972); Bronner v. Goldman, 361 F.2d 759 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 933 (1966); Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959);
Aubin v. H. Hentz & Co., 303 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. Fla. 1969); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust
Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
37. 81 F. Supp. at 1017. The court's emphasis on the plaintiff's inability to protect himself
is an apparent attempt to avoid the stricture of Restatement § 286(d), which states as a
prerequisite to a plaintiff's recovery that he "has not so conducted himself as to disable him-
self from maintaining an action." Restatement of Torts § 286(d), at 752 (1934). This refers
to all of the common law defenses to a negligence action. Id. at 758. A comment to that sec-
tion states: "If, however, the enactment is intended to protect persons from a danger, from
which their immaturity or other inferiority renders them incapable of protecting themselves,
the [defendant] is liable although the conduct... is such that but for the statute it would
be regarded as contributory negligence . . ." Id. at Comment j. The court discovered no
"immaturity or other inferiority" on the part of the plaintiff, other than relative inexperience
in the securities market. Would an experienced trader be barred from recovery? See Part I
B infra.
38. 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (allowing civil damage action alleging misleading proxy state-
ments under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)).
39. Id. at 433.
40. Id. at 432.
41. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
42. Margin Requirements 1475.
43. Id.; see Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677, 6s0
(D.D.C. 1971), where the court spoke of the private action as a means to achieve the congres-
sional purpose, to "regulate excessive speculation on credit."
44. See Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 401 US. 1013 (1971) ; Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290




In addition to the tort and Borak rationales, a third basis exists upon which
an injured investor can bring an action against his creditor. Section 29(b) of
the 1934 Act4" voids any contract in violation of the Act or the rules and regu-
lations thereunder, 46 and has been interpreted as making the contract or trans-
action voidable at the option of the "innocent party."47 It gives to the borrower
aggrieved by the overextension of credit a cause of action for rescission of the
transaction. 48 It is probably more accurate to describe this cause of action as
express rather than implied.4 9 Courts have recognized section 29(b) as the basis
of a cause of action for rescission under the margin rules;5 0 others have recog-
nized it as a defense when a broker seeks recovery of the price of securities
purchased in a transaction violating the margin requirements.rl
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
46. "Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, and every contract . . . heretofore or hereafter made, the perfor-
mance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice
in violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall be
void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule,
or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, and (2)
as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have ac-
quired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the mak-
ing or performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, or regula-
tion . . . ." Id. As will be pointed out below, the language of the section requires a much
closer examination for the proper determination of which rights should be deemed void. See
notes 120-30 infra and accompanying text.
47. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1970); Greater Iowa Corp.
v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 792 (8th Cir. 1967); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312
F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
48. A question of the utmost significance in actions for rescission, and in cases where
§ 29 is used defensively (see note 51 infra and accompanying text), is exactly what transac-
tion did violate § 7. The significance will be made apparent below. See notes 116-24 infra
and accompanying text.
49. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1759 (2d ed. 1961) ; Margin Requirements 1478.
50. Warshow v. 11. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); cf. Appel v. Levine,
85 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
51. See Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1002 (1973) (recognizing § 29(b) as a defense to defendant's counterclaim for the balance
of the purchase price, although rejecting its applicability in that case to avoid double re-
covery); Cooper v. Union Bank, 354 F. Supp. 669 (C.D. Cal. 1973). But see E.F. Hutton &
Co. v. Weinberg, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,332 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1964); Irving Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 31 Misc. 2d 628, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. 1961) (summary judgment granted plaintiff-broker despite allegation of Regula-
tion T violation). These cases clearly were wrong when decided, and relled upon languago
from Nichols & Co. v. Columbus Credit Corp., 204 Misc. 848, 126 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct.
1953), aff'd mem., 284 App. Div. 870, 134 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Ist Dep't 1954), a case involving
violation of a margin requirement of the New York Cotton Exchange, and, therefore ob-




Much controversy has been generated by the question whether the borrower's
participation in the transaction bars his recovery in a private action under
the margin rules. The position that it does has been stated in terms of both the
contract doctrine of pari delicto52 and the tort defense of contributory negli-
gence.5 3 Since the label applied has no apparent effect on the analysis, the term
panl delicto will be used herein to refer to both defenses.
The early cases did not examine the applicability of pari delicto to private
actions under the margin requirements." The Supreme Court's decision in
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.55 raised doubts regarding
the availability of this defense in all areas where private suits are permitted to
further public purposes under Borak, including actions under the margin require-
ments. However, Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank"" denied recovery against
a bank on the grounds that the granting of relief would encourage the kind
of fraudulent misrepresentation attributable to plaintiff customer.57 In Pearl-
52. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
53. See, e.g., Aubin v. H. Hentz & Co., 303 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
54. Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949). See also
Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956); Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp.
581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. ill (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Appel v.
Levine, 85 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
Such holdings clearly are necessary if there is to be a private action for relief since most
margin rules violations involve some measure of customer participation. Nonetheless, there
is a great deal of conflict among the cases. Compare Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677, 680 (D.D.C. 1971) ("This Court does not intend to change this
explicitly expressed legislative judgment by judicial fiat thereby imposing common law negli-
gence and causation standards upon the regulations.") with Aubin v. H. Hentz & Co, 303
F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (S.D. Fla. 1969) ("However, a broker's liability for violation of this
statute is not absolute. It is subject to traditional tort concepts of causation and contributory
negligence.").
55. 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (plaintiff's participation in antitrust violations did not bar his
recovery where defendant had coerced his participation).
56. 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd mem., 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), crt. denied,
396 U.S. 904 (1969).
57. Id. at 89-90. The defendant with due diligence could have discovered plaintiffs fraud.
Id. at 83-85. The most important effect of this finding was to deprive the defendant of the
benefit of § 3(h) of Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.3(h) (1974), which provides that a "good
faith" mistake will not be deemed a violation of the Regulation. But see § 29(c) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(c) (1970), which states: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed...
to affect the validity of any loan or extension of credit ... made ... prior or subsequent to
the enactment of this chapter, unless at the time of the making of such loan or extension of
credit ... the person making such loan or extension of credit ... shall have actual knowledge
of facts by reason of which the making of such loan or extension of credit... is a violation
of the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder .... " Compare
Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (no recovery, relying on statutory
1974]
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stein v. Scudder & German,58 the court concluded that the disadvantages of
giving the "unscrupulous" plaintiff a windfall recovery were outweighed by the
"salutary policing effect" a private cause of action would have upon broker-
dealers.509 The court distinguished Serzysko and Moscarelli v. Staturem on the
grounds that those cases, unlike Pearlstein, involved fraudulent deception of
the defendants. Relying on Perma Life, the court concluded that the defense
of pari delicto was not desirable in the margin rules context.0 ' Judge Friendly
dissented on the grounds that the holding would encourage customers to violate
the margin rules.62
Cases subsequent to Pearlstein have ignored, 3 rejected,04 and distinguished"5
that decision. None of those cases, however, are inconsistent with the Pearlstein
holding. Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth0 and Tartell v. Chelsea Na-
tional Bank67 involved plaintiffs who had actively misrepresented the purpose
of the loan, thus coming within Serzysko, which had been left standing by
Pearlstein. Gordon v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc.,'8 which explicitly rejected
Pearlstein,69 concerned a violation of the New York Stock Exchange maintenance
margin, rather than a violation of Regulation T and section 7(c). The customer
was aware of the violation and the broker-dealer was not.70
purpose (Borak) and traditional tort concepts where plaintiff and defendant's employee con-
spired to defraud defendant).
58. 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971), noted in 71 Colum.
L. Rev. 1521 (1971) and 39 Fordham L. Rev. 782 (1971).
59. 429 F.2d at 1141.
60. 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See note 57 supra.
61. 429 F.2d at 1141-42 & n.10.
62. Id. at 1148 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
63. For example, Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972),
a case almost identical to Serzysko, relied on the doctrine of pari delicto to deny recovery to
a plaintiff who gave a fraudulent non-purpose statement to a bank which, with reasonable
diligence, could have discovered the true purpose. The court cited Moscareli, Serzysko, and
even the dissent in Pearlstein, but did not cite the majority opinion or attempt to distinguish
the cases.
64. Gordon v. duPont Glore Forgan Inc., 487 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1973), cart. denied, 94
S. Ct. 3071 (1974).
65. Tartell v. Chelsea Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd mer.,
470 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1972), another case resembling Serzysko in its facts, viewed Pearlstein's
refusal to "foliow or to attack" Serzysko as leaving that decision standing as valid precedent.
66. 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972).
67. 351 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 470 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1972).
68. 487 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3071 (1974).
69. Id. at 1263.
70. The broker who was charged with overseeing the Gordons' account "Inadvertently"
allowed it to become undermargined. Id. at 1261. The availability of § 6(v) of Regulation T,
12 C.F.R. § 220.6(k) (1974) to excuse the broker's mistake in Gordon as an "Innocent
mechanical mistake" and therefore not a violation is made doubtful by Landry v. Hemphill,
Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 371 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973) (construing the
term mechanical to "exempt from liability only computational and similar errors").
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On the other hand, Pearlstein has been followed in two cases that resemble it
on their facts, since they involve broker-dealers who violated Regulation T but
were not induced to do so by any fraud on the part of their customers. 71 It has
also been followed in a case not involving a misrepresentation of the plaintiff's
purpose to a lending bank.7 2
Notwithstanding the seemingly conflicting language of the decisions, analysis
shows that the cases on the question of customer participation do not conflict.
Thus, prior to section 7(f) and Regulation X, if the plaintiff had actively mis-
represented the purpose for which he intended to use a bank loan and the bank
was deceived, he would have been barred under Serzysko; if he had engaged in
other fraudulent conduct with respect to the broker-dealer, Moscardli would
have barred recovery. If the customer were aware of the facts that gave rise to
a violation, but failed to inform the broker-dealer or bank, which was unaware,
it is possible (but not definite) that under Gordon his recovery was barred
even absent misrepresentation. If, however, both the broker-dealer and customer
(or bank and borrower) were aware, Pearlstein would control and the creditor
would be liable, as he would be had the debtor been unaware. It also would seem
that the broker-dealer would be liable even if neither he nor the customer were
aware of the violation.7 8
C. Remedial Problems
Because of the procedural posture of the landmark cases in this area, the
question of appropriate relief for an investor injured by margin violations has
not received as careful consideration as have the previously discussed issues.
Whether a case involves an action for damages under either the tort or the Borak
rationale, a suit for rescission under section 29, or a defensive use of section 29 in
an action to recover the purchase price for securities or on a defaulted note,
74
a court must determine the proper method of redressing the injury suffered by
the aggrieved investor. As will be shown, this determination involves the resolu-
tion of some difficult theoretical problems.
A question that has led to inconsistent results in the cases is whether the
creditor is entitled to any recovery when the illegality of the transaction is used
defensively by the borrower under section 29(b). The problem can best be illus-
trated by reference to factual situations.
One such situation is where a broker has purchased securities for a customer's
cash account, and the customer has failed to make payment on the seventh day,
but the broker has failed to liquidate the account.75 The broker should be al-
71. Spoon v. Walston & Co., 345 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Mich. 1972), afd, 478 F2d 246
(6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp.
677, 680 (D.D.C. 1971).
72. Cooper v. Union Bank, 354 F. Supp. 669, 674, 676 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
73. Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002
(1973).
74. See notes 33-S1 supra and accompanying text.
76. Billings Associates, Inc. v. Bashaw, 27 App. Div. 2d 124, 276 N.YS.2d 446 (4th
19741
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lowed to recover the difference between the purchase price paid for the securities
and their value on the seventh day, when full payment should have been re-
ceived. 76 The subsequent illegality of the relationship should not void the trans-
action ab initio; the parties should be returned to their respective positions as
of the seventh day. Similarly, where the customer brings an action for rescission,
the transaction should be rescinded as of the seventh day.77
Dep't 1967). Many of the cases involving the defensive use of a margin violation are state
court cases. This is so because the action is usually in contract for the purchase price of
securities, as in Billings. See E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Weinberg, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 91,332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964); Irving Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 31
Misc. 2d 628, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1961), both discussed in note 51 supra.
Other cases involve actions by the investor for the profit from a transaction, as in Surgil v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 63 Misc. 2d 473, 311 N.Y.S.2d 157 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970), rev'd, 69
Misc. 2d 213, 329 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. T. 1971) (discussed in notes 136-39 infra and accom-
panying text), where federal questions are raised only in defense.
76. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Billings Associates, Inc. v. Bashaw, 27
App. Div. 2d 124, 276 N.Y.S.2d 446 (4th Dep't 1967), in which the court allowed the
plaintiff broker the difference between the purchase price and the highest value of the
security between the seventh day and the day of liquidation. This was actually more gen-
erous to the customer than necessary, giving him the benefit of any rise and fall In value
occurring subsequent to the seventh day. The court's award of damages has been criticized:
"The rendering uncoliectible of debts incurred in proscribed credit transaction, [the dis-
senters] thought, would be the best sanction for enforcing compliance with the credit pro-
visions. The dissenting opinion ... is the better reasoned." 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation
3307 (Supp. V. 1969). The dissent's reasoning, however, begs the question. Is the "proscribed
credit transaction" the initial purchase, or the holding after seven days; and if the latter,
is not the debt incurred therein rendered uncollectible under the majority's damage measure-
ment? In fact, the majority's award of damages is demonstrably correct. Section 29 declares
void as regards the rights of any violator "[elvery contract made in violation of ... this
chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every contract . . . the performance
of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice In
violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder . . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 18ce(b) (1970). The agreement in Billings was a simple cash purchase of securities
by the broker for the customer and was, therefore, not "made in violation" of § 7 or the
margin regulations; the performance of the contract, had it taken place, would not have in-
volved a violation. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970),
(Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). Section 29(b) is applicable only
because plaintiff broker's holding of the securities for the defendant's benefit was the "con-
tinuance of a relationship" in violation of Regulation T. The rights to be voided by § 29 are
only those accruing after the seventh day, when the relationship between plaintiff broker and
defendant customer became unlawful, and plaintiff was properly permitted to enforce those
rights which accrued prior to that time.
77. An interesting case in this respect is Spoon v. Walston & Co., 345 F. Supp. 518
(E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). There, defendant
broker executed what was to be a "day sale" for the plaintiff-that is, a purchase and sale at
a profit on the same day. When the stock declined plaintiff customer held, on the registered
representative's advice, in hopes of a later rise. On the settlement day the registered repre-
sentative applied for and received an extension from the appropriate committee of the New
York Stock Exchange on the basis of § 3(f) of Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(f) (1974),
falsely stating that he was unable to contact his customer. Several more extensions were ob-
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The problem arises in another context-that is, when a broker-dealer sells
securities relying in good faith on the customer's representation that he owned
the securities and would deliver them promptly. Such reliance protects the
broker-dealer initially, but after a time it may become appropriate for the broker-
dealer to purchase the securities on the open market and deliver them to the
purchaser in the original transaction (i.e., "buy in"). Failure to "buy in" after
such time as would put the broker-dealer on notice that the customer's intentions
are not as originally represented brings the broker-dealer into violation of Reg-
ulation T.78 In a subsequent action by the broker-dealer to recover the excess
of the price at which he "bought in" over the sale price, he should not be per-
mitted to recover for any price rise that took place subsequent to the time when
he should have liquidated but did not; he should be allowed to recover the loss
resulting from the price rise until that time.79
Finally, the issue can present itself in the context of actions by the customer
for damages. If the full purchase price has not been paid, the defendant's counter-
claim for the balance should be allowed as a set-off against the plaintiff's claim,
since to award the plaintiff damages, but not to require him to pay the balance
due on the purchase price, would be to grant him double recovery.80
tained on the basis of false applications and the stock finally was sold at a loss. The court
granted the plaintiff rescission but, because of his participation, allowed him to recover only
half his loss, stating that since rescission was an equitable remedy, the court should be
guided by principles of equity. 345 F. Supp. at 522. The court viewed the failure to sell
after the seventh day as the broker's violation, and apparently felt that fairness required
that plaintiff customer not recover his full loss. The court's basis for allowing the plaintiff
less than full recovery of his losses was not the measurement of damages from the date of
violation, as would have been appropriate, but the arbitrary allocation to plaintiff of re-
sponsibility for one half of his losses, measured from the date of purchase. It should be
pointed out, however, that since the parties contemplated a "day sale" the broker could not
have relied in good faith on the customer's intention to pay before he sold, and the original
transaction in fact violated § 4(c)(1)(i) of Regulation T, 12 CY.R. § 220.4(c)(1)(i) (1974).
But see Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1959), involving a failure to
bring a general account up to the required margin within five days. The court did not allow
the broker to recover on its counterclaim for decline in value occurring during the five day
period. This might be viewed as the court doing "rough justice," since it denied the plaintiff
rescission, deeming the broker's failure an "innocent mistake" of the type excused by § 6(v)
of Regulation T prior to the addition of the requirement that the mistake be "mechanical."
See 12 C.F.R. § 220.6(k) (1974).
78. "The good faith of a broker/dealer who has originally executed a sell order in com-
pliance with Regulation T must gradually dissipate as time passes without delivery of the
securities. The time comes when the good faith standard of section 4(c) (1) (ii) requires the
broker/dealer to make inquiry concerning the reason for delay and to act accordingly."
Naftalin & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d 1166, 1177 (8th Cir.
1972). There is no fixed time period within which delivery must be made, as there is for
payment in a cash purchase, because of the mechanical difficulties often encountered in ob-
taining possession of the share certificate. Id.
79. Id. at 1182.




A parallel question is whether a bank that is sued for damages or rescission
of a loan contract violative of Regulation U is entitled to return of the loan
proceeds. Clearly, in a rescission case, the defendant bank is not entitled to in-
terest on the loan, because this would amount to enforcement of the loan con-
tract. As has been stated, however:
It is virtual hornbook law that rescission of a contract requires the parties to place
each other as nearly as may be in statu quo ante.8 '
If in granting rescission the court permits the plaintiff borrower to retain the
principal still due on the loan, the court is placing the plaintiff in a better posi-
tion than he was prior to the transaction. There are cases, however, in which
the bank has been denied even the principal of the loan.82 The status quo can
be established by awarding the plaintiff borrower the difference between the
purchase price of the securities and the price received by the bank in the sale,
plus the interest paid on the loan by the plaintiff, but less the balance of unpaid
principal. The bank, counterclaiming for the unpaid principal, should succeed
not in enforcement of the loan agreement voidable under section 29(b), but in
a common law count for money had and received. 83
IV. TmE EFFECT OF SECTION 7(f) AND REGULATION X
The 1970 amendments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 84 are an attempt
to deal, inter alia, with abuses of secret foreign bank accounts by United States
citizens.8 5 Title III added section 7(f)8 6 to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
raising unanticipated questions regarding private liability for violation of the
margin requirements.8 T
A. Effect of Section 7(f) Upon the Theoretical Basis for
Implying a Private Cause of Action
Under either the tort rationale or Borak, the basic assumption behind the
implication of a cause of action in favor of an investor for violation of the
margin requirements has been that a purpose of the margin requirements is to
81. Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1972), quoting
from the district court's opinion, 332 F. Supp. 699, 706-07 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
82. E.g. Cooper v. Union Bank, 354 F. Supp. 669 (CMD. Cal. 1973); Serzysko v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd mem., 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969). The latter case is complicated by the fact that the plaintiff was
not allowed to recover, as discussed in notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text. The court
held that the bank had violated Regulation U through its negligence. The court may again
have been doing "rough justice" by "leaving the parties as it found them."
83. Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 446-47 (6th Cir. 1972).
84. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114.
85. H.R. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1970); S. Rep. No. 1139, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-4 (1970).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1970).
87. See notes 141-48 infra and accompanying text.
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protect the individual investor.88 This assumption, questionable when made, 0
is now even more so in light of section 7(f) and Regulation X. Congress and
the Federal Reserve Board recognized that achievement of the main purpose
-"to give a government credit agency an effective method of reducng... the
nation's credit resources which can be directed by speculation into the stock
market" 90 -was being frustrated by investors seeking credit in circumvention of
the margin requirements. The extension of the strictures of the margin require-
ments to investors raises questions as to whether a purpose of these requirements
remains protection of investors.
An examination of the legislative history of section 7(f) fails to reveal any
consideration of the question of private Hability.01 The sponsors were primarily
concerned with the "perniciously destabilizing effect" of "[t]he infusion of un-
regulated foreign credit"92 on the domestic securities market. According to Rep-
resentative Patman, chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, which considered the bill,
testimony before our committee indicated that Americans and foreigners were using
the facade of secret foreign bank accounts to purchase in our markets in violation
of the margin requirements . . . . Through a simple device of making the margin
requirements applicable to the borrower as well as to the lender, we will be equipping
the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . with sufficient legal and investigative
weapons to require adequate disclosure of foreign financing.03
It has been suggested that since the legislative history of section 7(f) does
not reveal any intention to overrule existing case law, that law remains intact. 4
Such a conclusion is not ineluctable. A body of law, such as the margin require-
ments, which has developed over a long period of time, obviously can have dif-
ferent purposes at different stages of development. Legislative history is not the
only means of determining what a particular parcel of legislation, rules, and
regulations seeks to achieve. A study of the legislation and the subject it covers
is often equally revealing. The recent trend in the area of margin regulation has
been to shut off alternative sources of unregulated credit95 and to extend cover-
age to over-the-counter securities. 6 Even if it is accepted that one of the original
88. See notes 33-51 supra and accompanying text.
89. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
90. Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (1949), quoting HR. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934).
91. See HE. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 24-25 (1970); S. Rep. No. 1139, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1970); Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1970); 116 Cong. Rec. 16951 et seq. (1970).
92. H.R. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1970).
93. 116 Cong. Rec. 16954 (1970).
94. Brodsky, Corporate and Securities Litigation: Margin Violation-Regulation X, 172
N.Y.LJ., July 3, 1974, at 1, coL 1. See Note, Regulation X and Investor-Lender Margin
Violation Disputes, 57 Arlnn. L. Rev. 208, 220-22 (1972).
95. See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970), and 34 Fed. Reg. 9196 (1969).
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purposes of the margin requirements was to protect the individual investor, it
can be argued persuasively that that purpose has shifted from protection of the
investor to protection of the market from investors seeking to overextend
themselves. With such a view of the present purpose of the margin requirements,
it is submitted that the damages action based upon either the tort or Borak
rationales should no longer be recognized. 97
Most of the private actions subsequent to the promulgation of Regulation X
have not discussed the effect of that provision on the basic assumptions leading
to the implication of a cause of action, 98 because these cases deal with trans-
actions that occurred prior to that regulation's effective date. It has twice been
suggested that any effect Regulation X has will be on transactions occurring
subsequent to its promulgation.9 The one case100 that has treated the question
of the effect of Regulation X has done so in the context of the pari delicto
defense.
B. Effect Upon the Defense of Pari Delicto
The effect of extending the margin requirements to include the investor upon
the reasoning of those cases that have previously disallowed the defense of in
pari delicto to the lender is clear. In PearlsteinT10 the court argued that while
Perma Life would apparently preclude recovery by a plaintiff who had not
been coerced into participating in the illegal scheme, "such a defense does not
appear desirable in the securities area here involved."102 This is so, said the
court, because
[u]nlike the antitrust laws which forbid both seller and buyer to enter into a pro-
scribed transaction, the federally imposed margin requirements forbid a broker to
extend undue credit but do not forbid customers from accepting such credit. This fact
97. There exists a possibility that actions for rescission based on § 29(b) will be affected
by the promulgation of Regulation X, but since the theory of liability and the remedy
sought are so closely entwined, the potential effect of Regulation X on this type of action
as a whole will be discussed in Part III C infra.
98. See, e.g., Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Bender v. New Zealand Bank & Trust (Bahamas) Ltd., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 94,522 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1974); Cooper v.
Union Bank, 354 F. Supp. 669 (CD. Cal. 1973).
99. Freeman v. Marine Midland Bank-New York, 494 F.2d 1334, 1337 n.4 (2d Cir.
1974); Spoon v. Waiston & Co., 345 F. Supp. 518, 522 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d
246 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). It is unclear why this should be so since Regulation X
causes questions regarding the continuing validity of the very basis for a private cause of
action.
100. SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., 362 F. Supp. 510 (SD.N.Y. 1973), aff'd sub nona.
SIPC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 94,583
(2d Cir. May 31, 1974).
101. Pearistein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1013 (1971).
102. Id. at 1141.
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appears to indicate that Congress has placed the responsibility for observing margins
on the broker .... 103
This reasoning is obviously no longer valid. Regulation X makes clear that its
purpose is to
prevent the infusion of unregulated credit ... into U.S. securities markets in cir-
cumvention of [the margin requirements] or by borrowers falsely certifying the
purpose of a loan or otherwise wilfully and intentionally evading the provisions of
those regulations.104
The responsibility for compliance with the margin requirements is now on the
investor as well as the broker. The issue must be reexamined in light of the new
circumstances created by Regulation X. Even if the courts do not accept the
position that the entire basis for a damages action for violation of the margin
requirements has been undermined, 10 5 there remains the question: To what
extent does investor participation bar recovery?
It has been argued that Regulation X does not alter the result, 10 because
even before its promulgation the investor who knowingly obtained credit in ex-
cess of that permitted under the margin requirements violated the law as an
"aider and abettor or a co-conspirator with the lender."' 0 7 Since the investor
violated the law before Regulation X, the argument concludes, and the pani
delicto defense was disallowed, there is no reason to reconsider the result on this
issue merely because the legal prohibition of the investor's conduct has become
dearer 08
The greatest weakness of this argument is that there is no judicial support for
the proposition that the investor who obtained credit in excess of the permissible
level was guilty of a violation prior to Regulation X.109 Therefore, the investor
is in a different position after Regulation X, and his new status requires a re-
evaluation of the applicability of the pari delicto defense.
The factors that determine whether one party should be granted a remedy
against the other party to an illegal bargain include
the degree of criminality or evil, the comparative innocence or guilt of the parties,
the extent of public harm involved, the moral quality of the conduct of the parties,
and the severity of the penalty or forfeiture that will result from refusal of relief.110
103. Id. See generally Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677,
680 (D.D.C. 1971).
104. 12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1974).
105. See text accompanying note 125 infra.
106. Brodsky, Corporate and Securities Litigation: Margin Violation-Regulation X,
172 N.Y.L.J., July 3, 1974, at 3, cols. 3-4.
107. Id. at col. 4.
108. Id.
109. Indeed the attitude of the Pearlstein court indicates that plaintiff was deemed guilty
of unscrupulous, but not unlawful, conduct. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
110. 6A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1534 (1962). A consideration that has often led to a
holding that the plaintiff in an action for restitution is not in pan delicto with the defendant
is the unjust enrichment of the defendant. This is involved where the plaintiff has performed
1974]
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There is common law support for the proposition that a party who enters an
illegal bargain under duress, as in Pernza Life, or who is not himself prohibited
from entering the type of arrangement involved, as in Pearlstein, is not in pad
delicto with the party who either coerces the illegal performance,"" or is him-
self under a legal prohibition." 2 It is possible, then, to construe Pearlstein con-
sistently with the view that pari delicto can be a defense in private actions for
damages under the margin requirements, but not on the facts in that case."1
The illegality of the investor's action subsequent to Regulation X simply be-
comes an additional factor to consider and to operate in favor of his being held
in pari delicto with the lender.
This is especially sound where the plaintiff is an experienced investor. He
should be presumed to be familiar with the margin requirements applicable to
him. Although performance of an illegal bargain by one ignorant of the law
should not always bar recovery for his consequent injury," 4 it is submitted
that only excusable ignorance should permit the court to discount plaintiff's
illegal conduct as a weight in the scales of pari delicto. The party asserting his
own ignorance should have the burden of proving both his ignorance and its
justifiability." 5 When, however, the investor is ignorant of the facts giving rise
to the violation, it is likely that this would constitute an "innocent mistake"
and he would not be guilty of violating Regulation X.10
It is submitted that the illegality of the investor's actions should tip the scales
in favor of a finding that in the Pearlstein factual situation the investor is in
pad delicto with the broker and therefore not entitled to recovery. The investor's
active procurement of the broker's forbearance, 1 7 and the fact that he engaged
his side of the illegal bargain, but the defendant has not. The courts have been much more
willing to grant restitution in such a case than they have been to grant specific enforcement
where the contract remains executory, or to grant enforcement of the contract by means of
a damages award that gives the plaintiff the value of the defaulted performance. Id. Such
an unjust enrichment is absent in the margin violation cases since presumably both sides have
performed and the investor is now dissatisfied with his bargain. The broker is enriched only
to the extent of his commission.
111. Id. at § 1537.
112. Id. at § 1540.
113. In light of the court's noncommittal attitude towards Moscarelli and Serzysko, such
an interpretation is reasonable. The court "decline[d] either to follow or to attack these
holdings" as they "need not be read to contradict [the] view of the law" that it took. 429
F.2d at 1141-42. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
114. 6A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1539 (1962).
115. Such a rule would be consistent with the Serzysko court's position that an Investor's
sophistication should not bar him from bringing the action, but ought to be relevant in
determining whether he is entitled to recover. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
It would also minimize the difficulty inherent in making inquiry into a party's subjective
knowledge in that the investor must show not only that he was not familiar with the margin
requirements, but that he also had no reason to know.
116. 12 C.F.R. § 224.6(a) (1974).
117. 429 F.2d at 1138, 1146. It should also be pointed out that the plaintiff originally
purchased the securities in question, which were of a speculative nature, against strong advice
of the defendant. Id. at 1145-46 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
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in a number of such transactions,118 indicates that the plaintiff in Pearlstein
was hardly in need of protection. The court's alternative rationale-that the
danger of giving windfall profit "to an unscrupulous investor is outweighed by
the salutary policing effect" 119 upon brokers exerted by private damage actions
-has lost whatever force it had before Regulation M It can hardly be argued
that private actions will have a "salutary policing effect" on investors who are
intent upon evading the margin requirements, and who comprise the class of
persons at whom section 7(f) and Regulation X were specifically aimed.120 Per-
mitting such an action would encourage such evasion by investors and frustrate
the congressional purpose.
The only case which provides any guidance as to what effect Regulation X
will be given by the courts is SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co.,121 which involved
the refusal by the court to recognize certain claims against an insolvent broker-
dealer under the Securities Investors Protection Act of 197 0 .'2 Although the
claim asserted was actually for the profit resulting from a transaction held to
have violated Regulation T, the district court analyzed the case as though it
were a suit for damages by the investor.I2- In disallowing the claim, the court
declared that whatever the validity of the theory that damage actions against
brokers for violation of Regulation T deter future violations, this was not the
case where Securities Investor Protection Corp. is paying the debts of the
broker.124 The district court went on to hold that Regulation X also prevented
the awarding of damages to an investor:
The dear import of Regulation X is that Congress was determined not to limit the
burden of compliance to brokers alone but rather extended it to customers as well.im
Although the court's reasoning is correct, the force of this case as precedent for
the proposition that Regulation X undermined private damage actions for viola-
tion of the margin requirements is diminished by the fact that the case was in
reality an action for recovery of profit. 126 In addition, on appeal, the court's
118. Id. at 1138.
119. Id. at 1141.
120. S. Rep. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
121. 362 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd sub nom. SIPC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 94,583 (2d Cir. May 31, 1974).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (1970).
123. This can be seen from the fact that the court relied upon Serzysko v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd mem., 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969), discussed in notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text; Mosca-
relli v. Statune, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), discussed in note 57 supra; and Aubin
v. H. Hentz & Co., 303 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. Fla. 1969), note 54 supra, to distinguish Pearstein,
rather than pointing out the fact that a different type of action was involved in Packer
Wilbur than in PearIstein. The three cases cited involved actions for damages, as does Pearl-
stein.
124. 362 F. Supp. at 512-14.
125. Id. at 515.
126. See note 123 supra. Moreover, the court's holding on this point was alternative to a




finding of a Regulation T violation was rejected by the Second Circuit in dic-
tum, 1 7 and it is possible to argue that there can be no violation of Regulation X
without a violation of Regulation T.128 The Second Circuit, however, was not
faced with an appeal of the investor's claim, and expressed no opinion concern-
ing the effect of Regulation X on the claim. 2 ) The district court's opinion is
some indication, however slight, that section 7(f) and Regulation X will be given
some weight in evaluating a plaintiff's conduct to determine whether he is en-
titled to relief.
The type of case most clearly affected by Regulation X is one involving an
investor who sues the broker-dealer to recover the profit realized on a trans-
action that violates Regulation T. Such a case could involve a classical applica-
tion of the pari delicto doctrine, 30 since the investor's cause of action is for
breach of contract. It can also be considered as involving a defensive use of
section 29(b), which would seem applicable in this situation. The transaction
would now be void "as regards the rights of [the customer] who, in violation
of such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the per-
formance of [a] contract" that violated the margin requirements.131 Thus, the
result in Packer, Wilbur 3 2 was correct if the finding of a violation of Regula-
tion X was correct. Similarly, Cohen v. G.F. Rothschild & Co.'83 and Klein v.
D.R. Comenzo Co., 34 each of which on the basis of illegality refused to enforce
a customer's contract (impliedly holding the customer in pari delicto with the
broker-dealer), and each of which was arguably wrong when decided, 3 5 would
127. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCII Fed. Sec. L. Rep. I 94,583, at 96,042. The denial
of the claim by the investor in question was not appealed; the Second Circuit indicated its
doubt whether a broker other than Packer Wilbur, which was also involved in the transac-
tion, had violated Regulation T (as the district court had held), but found it unnecessary to
reach the issue since it affirmed the denial of the other broker's claim on an alternative
ground. Id. See note 129 infra.
128. See notes 142-152 infra and accompanying text.
129. The court did suggest that it found the district court's first reason for denying the
claim persuasive: "Any such challenge would fail, for the district court was correct In
concluding that '[olne who engages in a fraudulent transaction cannot reap the benefits of
the Act's intended protection.' We cannot believe that Congress intended that an active and
sophisticated securities investor such as Arenstein, who deliberately engaged In a margin vio-
lation, should enjoy the benefits of SIPA." [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ff 94,583, at 96,043. This does not indicate that an investor who violates Regulation X
will never be allowed recovery but rather only that he will not recover against SIPC. The
court's assumption that Arenstein was guilty of a Regulation X violation is significant. See
note 149 infra and accompanying text.
130. See note 5 supra.
131. The argument based upon § 29(b) is probably stronger than the common law illeg-
ality one because of the absolute language of the section. It appears to be less flexible, at least
when used defensively. See note 155 infra and accompanying text.
132. See note 124 supra. But see 43 Fordham L. Rev. 136 (1974).
133. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 90,849 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
134. 207 N.Y.S.2d 739 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1960).
135. Since the customers were not bound by the margin requirements, the rights they
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be correct today. On the other hand, Surgil v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,130 in
which the trial court permitted recovery by a customer of the profit from a sale
of securities that took place when it became apparent that she would not be able
to pay for them within seven days, would arguably be decided differently
today.' 37 The case deserves closer analysis, however, since it discloses a possible
gap in the coverage of Regulation X.
The plaintiff in Surgil opened a special cash account with the defendant and
ordered securities worth approximately $36,000. When it became apparent that
the plaintiff would be unable to make payment within the seven days allowed
by Regulation T, the broker sold out the account and a $4,000 profit resulted.
Although the confirmation stated that the sale had been made as agent for the
plaintiff, defendant refused to pay the profit to her, whereupon plaintiff sued.
The court rejected the defendant's claim that Regulation T had been violated
and that therefore plaintiff could not recover, pointing out that the sale had
occurred prior to the expiration of the seven day period, and that the broker-
dealer had not "cancel[led] or otherwise liquidate[d]" the original transaction
because it sold as agent, not as principal.1
38
Neither the trial court nor the appellate term discussed the possibility that
the transaction violated Regulation T from the beginning. This, of course would
depend on whether the broker-dealer had a good faith belief that the customer
intended both to make prompt payment and to hold the shares. The relevant
findings of fact were that the plaintiff, at the time of purchase, expected a
acquired in the transaction that involved the extension of credit beyond the permissible limits
were not voided by § 29(b). See Margin Requirements 1481-83. It is also arguable that the
plaintiffs were not in pari delicto with the broker-dealer defendants. 6A A. Corbin, Contracts
§ 1540 (1962); see note 112 supra and accompanying text. On the other hand, it is possible
to argue that the Rothschild and Comenzo courts were correct in refusing to enforce execu-
tory illegal contracts since doing so would force the broker to complete a transaction in vio-
lation of the margin requirements. As was pointed out earlier, the courts have been reluctant
to grant enforcement of illegal bargains that remain executory. See note 110 supra. This
reasoning is especially forceful where the customer has not made any payment toward the
purchase price.
136. 63 Misc. 2d 473, 311 N.Y.S.2d 157 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970), rev'd, 69 Aisc. 2d 213,
329 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. T. 1971).
137. The appellate term reversed the decision, holding that the plaintiff had implicitly
misrepresented her ability to make payment within the required time and, therefore, violated
the 'mplidt" requirement in Regulation T, "that customers as well as brokers have respon-
sibilities to take part only in bona fide transactions." 69 Misc. 2d at 215, 329 N.Y.S.2d at
994-95. This court apparently adopted the reasonings of Cohen v. G.F. Rothschild & Co,
[1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 90,849 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), and Klein
v. D.R. Comenzo Co., 207 N.Y.S.2d 739 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1960), although neither case was
cited.
138. 63 Misc. 2d at 475, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 160. The court could have held that even had
Regulation T been violated the rights of the plaintiff did not become void under the law as
it then stood. See note 135 supra. The appellate term, on the other hand, held that the broker
had in fact "liquidated" the transaction pursuant to Regulation T. 69 Misc. 2d at 214, 329
N.Y.S.2d at 994.
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"wealthy friend" to provide the funds for the securities, and also that the
broker was negligent in its investigation of plaintiff's financial background. 180
Some interesting problems are brought to light by the Surgil case. It would
seem that if a broker did not have a good faith belief that the customer intended
to pay, but the customer in fact intended to pay, the broker has violated Reg-
ulation T.140 Would the customer have violated Regulation X by obtaining
credit in a transaction that was a violation of Regulation T?141 If the customer
had a reasonable basis for believing that he could pay within the time limit,
he should be protected by the "innocent mistake" provision of Regulation X,142
and he should not be barred from recovering either a profit or a loss resulting
from the transaction. Suppose, on the other hand, that the broker-dealer in good
faith believes that the customer's intentions are proper, but in fact the customer
either intends to sell before he pays or not to make "prompt" payment. Unless
a duty to make a reasonable investigation is read into Regulation T,"4 the
broker-dealer has not violated Regulation T. A literal reading of Regulation X
seems to compel the conclusion that the customer has not violated that pro-
vision.' 44 Such a reading would leave a gap in the coverage of Regulation X to
the benefit of a customer who succeeds in deceiving his broker.' 45 Suppose fur-
ther that in this situation the broker becomes aware of the customer's inten-
tions. Is he obligated to liquidate the transaction immediately, even if seven
days have not passed since the purchase? The reasoning of Naftalin & Co. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,146 in connection with cash sales
indicates that he is; if he fails to do so he is violating Regulation T and the
customer is violating Regulation X.147 This would lead to the anomalous result
139. 63 Misc. 2d at 476-77, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 161-62. The appellate term deemed the
broker's actions "imprudent," but not a violation of Regulation T. 69 Misc. 2d at 214, 329
N.Y.S.2d at 994.
140. See note 18 and accompanying text.
141. Regulation X provides that "[cjredit obtained from a broker/dealer shall conform
to the provisions of [Regulation TI which is hereby incorporated in this part," and If the
credit does not so conform the customer violates Regulation X. 12 C.F.R. § 224.2(a)(2)
(1974).
142. 12 C.F.R. § 224.6(a) (1974).
143. It is possible to argue that a broker-dealer who fails to make a reasonable Investiga-
tion into the financial background of his customer cannot in good faith accept that person's
promise to pay. Contra, Surgil v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 69 Misc. 2d 213, 214, 329 N.Y.S.2d
993, 994 (App. T. 1971). A better view is that a failure to make a reasonable investigation is
merely evidence that the broker-dealer did not rely in good faith on the promise.
144. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
145. If the broker suffered a loss on the transaction he would have a cause of action un-
der rule 10b-5. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1967).
146. 469 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1972). See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
147. This apparently was the district court's interpretation of the situation in Packer,
Wilbur. SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., 362 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), atI'd sub nom.
Securities Inv. Protection Corp. v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 94,583 (2d Cir. May 31, 1974). The facts do not seem to comport
with this interpretation however. The investor claimant gave a cash buy order to Coggeshall
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that under Regulation X the customer who successfully deceives his broker-
dealer about his intention to pay might recover the profit from the transaction,
whereas the investor who either does not succeed in his deception or is frank
about his intentions cannot recover. A partial solution to the problem is to
interpret Regulation X to mean that an investor violates the provision if he
obtains credit that would violate Regulation T if the facts were known to the
broker-dealer. 148
There is some indication in Packer Wilbur that such a reading might be given
to Regulation X. Despite the dictum to the effect that there had been no viola-
tion of Regulation T, the court of appeals in Packer Wilbur considered the
customer's actions to be a violation of Regulation X.149 This indicates that the
court either did not perceive the gap in Regulation X, or gave Regulation X
the interpretation set forth above. In either event, the dictum is useful authority
for the proposition that the successfully deceitful investor is guilty of a violation
of Regulation X. Under such a rule an investor would be denied profit from a
margin rules violation regardless of the broker-dealer's knowledge, and the
broker-dealer would be unable to recover a deficiency resulting from the liquida-
tion of a transaction that had violated Regulation T.15 0 This would remove the
"heads-I-win tails-you-lose" aspect to which Judge Friendly objected.1"'
C. Effect Upon Remedial Issues
If it is determined that a cause of action still edsts in favor of an investor who
has violated Regulation X, and that under the specific circumstances the in-
vestor is not in pari delicto with the defendant in the case, there still remains
& Hicks, Inc., which executed it. Four days later the customer had Coggeshall deliver the
securities to Packer, Wilbur, who gave a check to Coggeshall for the purchase price. The
district court held that this should have given Coggeshall notice that Arenstein, the customer,
intended to sell before he paid and that Coggeshall therefore violated Regulation T. This is
difficult to accept, since the check from Packer, Wilbur would seem to constitute at least
conditional payment. Nor did Packer, Wilbur seem to violate Regulation T since it received
the securities promptly. The Second Circuit stated in dictum that it did not consider Cogge-
shall's action a violation of Regulation T. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at
96,041-42; see text accompanying note 127 supra.
148. Cf. Surgil v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 69 Misc. 2d 213, 214, 329 N.Y.S.2d 993,
994 (App. T. 1971).
149. After explaining where its interpretation of Regulation T differed from the district
court's, the Second Circuit said in a footnote: "None of this is to exonerate in any tvay a
customer who deliberately misrepresents his intention of prompt payment. If the bona fide
intent of a customer should change after the broker had purchased the stock for him, the
customer could legitimately direct his broker to sell . . . . The case of a customer who
initially misrepresents his intention to his broker is different. He violates Regulation X ...
and Rule 10b-5 by making this misrepresentation." [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. at 96,041 n.7 (citation omitted). (The significance of the reference to rule 10b-S
is explained in note 145 supra.)
150. As pointed out below, the investor is still entitled to use section 29(b) defensively.
See note 155 infra and accompanying text.
151. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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to be determined whether Regulation X affects the remedy to which the plaintiff
is entitled.
The argument has been advanced that since Regulation X and section 7(f)
put the investor in violation of the 1934 Act, he is no longer entitled to an
award of damages since this would amount to enforcement of a contract which
is void under section 29(b). 152 It is submitted that this argument misconstrues
the nature of a damage action for margin violations and equates it with an action
for breach of contract. The award of damages in a breach of contract action
"seeks to place the aggrieved party in the same economic position he would
have had if the contract had been performed. ' 1 r3 In so doing, a court enforces
the contract and awards the plaintiff the value of the defendant's performance.
The award of damages in the margin violation case does not enforce the illegal
contract, which has already been performed. 15 4 The plaintiff seeks not the
"value" of the defendant's performance, but restoration to the economic position
he enjoyed before the contract was performed. The remedy is necessarily a
restitutionary one, and not one for enforcement of any right that accrued under
the illegal contract. Thus, it seems that the combination of section 7(f), Regu-
lation X, and section 29(b) does not affect the plaintiff's right to damages
as a remedy.
It is possible that Regulation X will have an effect on actions by investors
for rescission under section 29(b). Even prior to Regulation X, Judge Friendly
in his Pearlstein'55 dissent and Judge Murrah for the court in Najtalin50 argued
that a conscious wrongdoer is not entitled to rescission under section 29(b).
That relief, the argument proceeds, is equitable and should be granted only to
parties who can be characterized as "innocent."
It may be that in the context of this case Naftalin, as the customer, cannot be the
violator since, as we have seen, the onus of complying with section 7 and Regulation
T is entirely upon the broker/dealers. Nevertheless, we cannot perceive how, under
any stretch of the imagination, Naftalin can qualify as an "unwilling innocent party"
entitled to invoke section 29(b). To absolve Naftalin of all contractual obligations
after it had instigated and perpetuated these illegal schemes would be an inequitable
and gratuitous result.2
5 7
152. Note, Regulation X and Investor-Lender Margin Violation Disputes, 57 Minn. L.
Rev. 208, 220 (1972).
153. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 205 (1970).
154. An exception to this statement must be made for the case where the investor seeks
to recover profit retained by the broker-dealer, which is an action seeking to enforce the
contract. See note 110 and text accompanying note 130 supra. As pointed out earlier, such a
cause of action is undermined by Regulation X. See notes 130-37 supra and accompanying
text.
155. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. Judge Friendly pointed out that the
majority did not reach this question. 429 F.2d at 1149. He implies that his attitude might bo
different if called upon to enforce a contract that violated the margin requirements. He seems
to indicate that section 29(b) would be applied more rigidly when raised defensively, and
that the parties should be left as the law found them.
156. 469 F.2d at 1181-82. It should be noted, however, that the Naftalin court did in
effect grant rescission of the illegal portion of the transaction.
157. Id. at 1182.
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These authorities seem to be applying the maxim that a plaintiff must come
before the court of equity with "dean hands" in order to be granted relief. It
is possible to argue that the rescission action is not equitable in nature since it is
legislatively granted. However, Judge Friendly answers that
[d]espite the Draconian language, § 29(b) does not provide a pat legislative formula
for solving every case in which a contract and violation concur. Rather it was a
legislative direction to apply common-law principles of illegal bargain .... 158
Since the "unclean hands" maxim is the equitable corollary of the doctrine of
pan delicto,159 a "common-law principle of illegal bargain," it can be assumed
that section 29(b) directs its application as well. A clear indication that a court
will apply principles of equity when faced with the decision of whether to grant
rescission pursuant to section 29(b) is found in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.100
There, in the context of a merger achieved by misleading proxy statements in
violation of section 14(a) 1 6 1 of the 1934 Act, the Supreme Court said:
[Section] 29(b) leaves the matter of relief where it would be under Borak. without
specific statutory language-the merger should be set aside only if a court of equity
concludes, from all the circumstances, that it would be equitable to do so.'I
Mills may not be authority for the proposition that a "non-innocent" party
to a transaction can be refused rescission against the other party whose rights
are "void" within the literal language of section 29(b) because he has dearly
violated the 1934 Act. The language from Mills quoted in Naftalinlca seems to
presume that there is one "innocent" party and one "guilty" party to the trans-
action, and that the "innocent" party has the option of avoiding the contract
or holding the "guilty" party to it.lM It does not suggest a solution for the case
with two "guilty" parties. 05
The other case upon which Naftalin relied provides better support for its
argument that one "guilty" party cannot have rescission from another. Royal
Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith'06 involved an action for rescission based upon
rule 10b-5167 and section 29(b). It was held that the defendant could raise the
defenses of waiver and estoppel because the plaintiff failed to take action-
158. 429 F.2d at 1149.
159. Morrissey v. Bologna, 240 Miss. 284, 297, 123 So. 2d 537, 543 (1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 212 (1961); 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 141 (1966); 30 C.J.S. Equity § 94 (1965).
160. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
162. 396 US. at 388.
163. 469 F.2d at 1182.
164. 396 U.S. at 387.
165. Id. at 388. In addition, the Court indicated that the parties seeking rescission, in-
dividual shareholders in the merged corporation, did not have a statutory right to rescission
in their own right since they were not parties to the merger agreement. Whether rescis-
sion should be granted in the corporation's name by virtue of the derivative status of
plaintiffs depended upon whether that would be fair to the rest of the shareholders. Id.
166. 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
167. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1974).
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indeed he continued as a director-after learning the facts.10 8 According to the
opinion:
The purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is to protect the innocent investor, not
one who loses his innocence and then waits to see how his investment turns out
before he decides to invoke the provisions of the Act.1609
This reasoning seems especially applicable to the margin violation cases. 17 0
What emerges from this discussion is both clear Supreme Court authority in
Mills that rescission under section 29(b) is to be granted according to equitable
principles, and some indication in the cases that, even prior to Regulation X,
an investor who had intentionally obtained excess credit would be deemed to
have "unclean hands" and therefore not entitled to rescission. Possibly section
7(f) and Regulation X will influence more courts to accept this latter view, for
such an investor would violate these provisions. It can hardly be contested that
an investor whose acts are both unscrupulous and unlawful has hands which are
less clean than one whose acts are merely unscrupulous. 17 1
Aside from the theoretical effects of section 7(f) and Regulation X on the
availability of certain remedies, it is possible that these provisions will, as a
practical matter, have some impact on the measure of recovery. It may be
assumed from the frequency with which courts point out that only the broker-
dealer or bank was in violation of the law172 that they are influenced by that
fact in fashioning remedies, that is in not allowing broker-dealers to recover the
balance of purchase price due on securities 78 or banks to recover the interest on
loans. 7 4 Section 7(f) and Regulation X may lead courts to analyze more pre-
cisely the rights of these defendants since both they and their customers will
now be in violation of the law.
168. 312 F.2d at 212-13.
169. Id. at 213-14. Curiously, the defense of estoppel appears never to have been raised
in the context of a margin violation. It would seem that the broker-dealer relied to his
detriment upon the investor's representations, and the argument could be made that the
investor is therefore estopped from rescinding.
170. The investor who knowingly obtains credit beyond the level permitted by the margin
requirements has "lost his innocence," and he then "waits to see how his investment turns
out." If it is successful, he takes his profit; if it fails, he sues his broker for damages or
rescission.
171. The question occurs whether an action for rescission is necessary if one for damages
is possible, since the recovery in either would be virtually identical. Since, however, it is
unclear that a damage action would be able to withstand a pari delicto defense, the question
of the availability of restitution is an important one.
172. E.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Cooper v. Union Bank, 354 F. Supp. 669, 676, 681-83 (C.D.
Cal. 1973); Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677, 680-81
(D.D.C. 1971); cf. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
173. See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 81-83 supra and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The law regarding private causes of action was in a state of uncertainty even
prior to the adoption of section 7(f) and Regulation X. Perhaps Regulation X
does not diminish this uncertainty. Nevertheless, Regulation X will have a
significant impact on civil actions for margin violations. First, it may undercut,
in part, the theoretical basis for implying a private cause of action in this area
of securities law. Second, it should make the courts more willing to employ the
doctrine of pari delicto to deny recovery. Given the propensity of courts to
imply a private right of action under the securities laws, Regulation X probably
will have its greatest effect in the application of the pan delicto defense.
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